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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-AVAILABILITY OF CoRAM NOBIS IN FEDERAL CASES

1939 Robert Morgan pleaded guilty to a
charge of mail theft and was sentenced by a federal district court to four years

INVOLVING RIGHT OF CouNSEL-ln
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imprisonment. He served the term and was released. In 1950 he was convicted
of a crime in New York state and sentenced as a second offender1 because of
his previous federal conviction. In 1952 he made application to the district court
of original sentence for a common law writ of coram nobis, seeking an order
vacating and setting aside his conviction by that court on the ground that he
was not given assistance of counsel and had not waived his constitutional right
to such assistance. His motion was denied. Reversed by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit and remanded for hearing.2 On certiorari to the Supreme
Court, held, Morgan was entitled to show by a motion in the nature of a writ
of error coram nobis that the federal conviction and sentence should be set
aside. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247 (1954).
The writ of error coram nobis is a common law writ of ancient vintage. It
was designed to allow attack, after the term of court, on a judgment rendered
in the context of a fact which, unknown to the court and not appearing in the
record, constitutes an error of such fundamental nature that it invalidates the
court proceeding and the judgment it produces.8 It is addressed to the trial
court and is based on error of fact, not law. The history of the writ in the federal courts is a spotty one although it was recognized in a civil case as early as
1833.4 As late as 1914, the Supreme Court refused to pass directly on whether
it was available in federal courts in criminal cases,5 and later statements of the
Court cast considerable doubt on its applicability.6 The lower federal courts
appear to have admitted its availability in cases arising since 1931,7 and in 1944
it was first granted in a case involving a claim of denial of right of counsel.8
The picture was further complicated, however, in 1948, when 28 U.S.C. §2255
was enacted.9 Section 2255 states that prisoners in custody under a federal
sentence who claim the right to release because of violation of their constitutional rights, because of lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or because
their sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may make a motion to

N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) c. 88, §§1941-1942.
States v. Morgan, (2d Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 67; the case is noted in 53
CoL. L. REv. 737 (1953) and 66 HAnv. L. REv. 1137 (1953).
3 FRANK, CoRAM NoBIS (1953); Freedman, "The Writ of Error Coram Nobis," 3
TEMPLE L.Q. 365 (1929); 20 VA. L. REv. 423 (1934).
4 Pickett's Heirs v. Legerwood, 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 142 (1833); Bronson v. Schulten,
104 U.S. 410 at 416 (1881).
5 United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 35 S.Ct. 16 (1914).
6 See United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 at 475, n. 4, 67 S.Ct. 1330 (1947).
7 Strang v. United States, (5th Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 820; Robinson v. Johnston,
(9th Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 998; Tinkoff v. United States, (7th Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d)
21.
s United States v. Steese, (3d Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 439; Roberts v. United States,
(4th Cir. 1946) 158 F. (2d) 150.
9 The Reviser's note states, "This section restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure
in the nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis. It provides an expeditious remedy
for correcting sentences without resort to habeas corpus.••." Reviser's note to 28 U.S.C.
(1952) §2255.
1
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the sentencing court to have the sentence set aside, vacated, or corrected. Several of the circuit courts seemed to assume that it superseded the common law
writ of coram nobis and, at the same time, limited this type of relief to those
persons actually in custody under federal sentence.10 The Morgan case definitely restores coram nobis as a concurrently available remedy, and seems to
limit section 2255 to the special case of a motion by an inmate of a federal
prison.11
If common law coram nobis is presently available in federal courts, there
might still be a question as to whether failure to advise of the right of counsel
or improper waiver of such right are proper grounds for the motion. Such
grounds were not among those traditionally recognized by the old cases.12
However, the Supreme Court has stated its opinion that coram nobis, if available at all, would be available in a case in which the error was so fundamental
as to render the trial proceeding irregular or invalid,13 It has also held that
violation of the Sixth Amendment guaranty of right of counsel14 destroys the
jurisdiction of the trial court. It appears, therefore, that such a violation is a
proper ground for coram nobis, and it has been so held by lower federal courts.15
Even if the Court is right in concluding that coram nobis still exists and that
lack of counsel is a proper basis for its application, it nevertheless appears that
the Court has overlooked another factor in the history of the writ in federal
courts. United States v. Moore16 established rules to be observed in granting
coram nobis, and the Supreme Court has upheld these rules in a previous
decision which has never been overruled.17 The rules are (I) the applicant
must allege his innocence, or set forth a meritorious defense of which he was
deprived by lack of counsel, and show that this defense would have resulted in
a different verdict from that given; (2) the applicant must show reasonable
diligence in presenting his claim; (3) the applicant should raise the question at
10 Crow v. United States, (9th Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 704; Lopez v. United States,
(9th Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 707; United States v. Lavelle, (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d)
202; United States v. Bradford, (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 197. But see United States
v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 at 219, 72 S.Ct. 263 (1951), in which Chief Justice Vinson
reviewed the legislative history of §2255.
11Accord: Howell v. United States, (4th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 213, cert. den. 337
U.S. 906, 69 S.Ct. 1048 (1949); Farnsworth v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 198 F.
(2d) 600; United States ex rel. Lavelle v. Fay, (2d Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 294.
122 BrsHoP, Nnw CRIMINAL PnocE.DUIUl, 4th ed., §1369 (1895).
13 United States v. Mayer, note 5 supra, at 68.
14 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right • • . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNsT., Amend VI. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 at 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1937); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 at 76, 62
S.Ct. 457 (1942). Fellman, "The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts," 30
NnB. L. REv. 559 (1951).
15 United States v. Steese, note 8 supra; Roberts v. United States, note 8 supra.
16 United States v. Moore, (7th Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 102, cert. den. 334 U.S. 849,
68 S.Ct. 1500 (1948).
17Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1711 (1947).
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the time of his conviction as a second offender or be estopped from doing so.18
In the Morgan case, the motion was not made until twelve years after the
original conviction and fourteen months after the second conviction; moreover,
the petitioner did not allege his innocence or any defense of which he was
deprived in the first case.19 Of course, if lack of counsel is so fundamental an
error as to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction, it would seem that a conviction
under such circumstances should fall regardless of the state of the petitioner's
innocence.20 The inconsistency between United States v. Moore and the principal case indicates that it would be in order for the Court to define more
adequately the ground-rules which are to be used in the granting of coram
nobis. If it is brought back to life without proper safeguards and limitations
on its use, the federal courts may be Hooded with motions to set aside ancient
convictions, and no conviction, even after sentence is served, will be free from
possible later attack.
John Leddy, S.Ed.

lS United States v. Moore, note 16 supra. Accord: United States v. Rockower, (2d
Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 423, cert. den. 337 U.S. 931, 69 S.Ct. 1484 (1949); United
States v. Bice, (4th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 843; Bowen v. United States, (5th Cir. 1951)
192 F. (2d) 515. Contra: United States ex rel. Turpin v. Snyder, (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F.
(2d) 742; Allen v. United States, (D.C. Ill. 1952) 102 F. Supp. 866.
19 United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 at 514, 74 S.Ct. 247 (1954).
20 Allen v. United States, (D.C. Ill. 1952) 102 F. Supp. 866 at 869: "A guilty
person in custody pursuant to a void judgment, is just as improperly deprived of his liberty
as is an innocent person. . • . A void judgment is as void today as it was twenty years ago."

